

## Durham Research Online

---

### Deposited in DRO:

14 September 2017

### Version of attached file:

proof

### Peer-review status of attached file:

Peer-reviewed

### Citation for published item:

Loughlin, Gerard (2017) '"The University"', in The Edinburgh critical history of nineteenth-century Christian theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 64-84. The Edinburgh critical history of Christian theology.

### Further information on publisher's website:

<https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-edinburgh-critical-history-of-nineteenth-century-christian-theology-hb.html>

### Publisher's copyright statement:

### Additional information:

---

### Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in DRO
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full DRO policy](#) for further details.

## The University

Gerard Loughlin

In 1910, the University of Berlin celebrated its centenary with lavish festivities that had been ten years in the planning. Max Lenz (1850–1932) had been hired to write a history of the university, copies of which were sent to fellow institutions throughout the world by order of the Emperor, Wilhelm II (1859–1941). The heads of these institutions, along with eminent professors and other dignitaries, were invited to Berlin for three days of laudation that began on 10 October with a service in Berlin Cathedral. This was followed with other gatherings and processions, with addresses and the bestowing of honorary degrees, and with banqueting.

The University could congratulate itself in this way because it could think its achievements of the ‘utmost moment’ in the progress of the world. ‘Every civilized nation owes a debt to German scholarship’, the President of the still young University of Chicago, Harry Pratt Judson (1849–1927), declared in responding to Berlin’s invitation (Howard 2006: 336).<sup>1</sup> It was a view that Julius Kafton (1848–1926), professor of systematic theology at Berlin, did not fail to elaborate in his sermon at the opening service.

Kafton’s sermon sets before us the difference that was the University of Berlin, the achievements of German scholarship in the course of the nineteenth century, and the place of theology therein. Kafton pointed to the development of *Wissenschaft* in the university, and of the university in relation to the state. *Wissenschaft* can be translated as ‘science’, but this may mislead, especially if one is used to distinguishing between the sciences and the humanities, imagining there to be at least two cultures in the university (Snow 1959). For *Wissenschaft* aimed to be universal in its scope, an approach for all university disciplines, to which all are subject.

The text that Kafton took for his sermon was 1 Corinthians 12: 4–12, which likens the members of the church to those of a body, the one body of Christ. Likewise, in the one body of the university there are many academic disciplines – different but united in and through the scientific approach. Kafton warned that the university might splinter and become a ‘bundle of specialized schools’. But this would not happen if it heeded the goal of unity, the ideal of *Wissenschaft*. The German university could be maintained, and would be maintained, ‘with God’s help’. Moreover, the unified university is but one member of a larger body, which is the nation, ‘assembled in the order of the state’. The university plays its part by pursuing science for its own sake, and by educating the young in that pursuit, the two being intimately linked. ‘No one can think of German culture and German intellectual life without the German universities. Their downfall would mean a collapse of the German nation – so important are they for the whole’ (Kafton, quoted in Howard 2006: 337–8).

The ideal of the German university, as presented by Kafton, had developed in the course of the nineteenth century. It had become increasingly influential throughout the world, and would become more so in the twentieth century. As Jacques Derrida remarks, the University of Berlin, 'even now, remains the most imposing reference for what has been handed down to us of the concept of the university' ([1990] 2004: 85). But Kafton also highlighted what many had and have come to see as a problem for that ideal: the threat of fragmentation, of a disordered body, with members pulling in different directions. One of those members was theology, and for many its place in the body of the university had become questionable by the end of the nineteenth century.

Max Lenz, who had written the history of the University of Berlin (1910–18), also lectured on the subject at the closing of the University's celebrations. Like Kafton, Lenz had a high regard for *Wissenschaft* and for the intimacy of university and state – science being the bedrock on which the 'bond of monarchy and university rests' (Lenz, quoted in Howard 2006: 339). But unlike Kafton, Lenz questioned the place of theology in the university. For theology seemed the one discipline that resisted the spirit of *Wissenschaft*, of disinterested enquiry. For theology is bound by dogma and church, answering to 'revelation' and ecclesial requirements. Science is either historical or natural (empirical), and so theology must become the former if it is to continue in the university committed to *Wissenschaft*. University theology must become – and was already becoming – the history or study of religions (*Religionsgeschichte* or *Religionswissenschaft*).

Lenz's argument against an unreformed, ecclesial theology was not new. It had been around from the start of the nineteenth century, and – as we shall see – it had been affecting theology throughout the century, with theology trying to become ever more *wissenschaftlich*. But for Lenz it had not been trying hard enough. Kafton and Lenz were at one in their enthusiasm for the ideal of the research university, a community pressing forward through the disinterested study of history and nature to an ever more united society. But for Lenz, theology had to become much more of a historical science than already achieved, and in that becoming put itself in question. These arguments have been strangely replayed at the beginning of the twenty-first century, with people again arguing that theology has no place in the university, or that if it has, it must become something else – study of religion or religious studies. But the fact that these arguments were being made at the beginning of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries testifies to the fact that theology has remained in the university, stubbornly resisting.

It is with the story of theology's resistance that this essay is concerned. And it is largely concerned with this in regard to the German university, where a distinctly modern idea of scientific theology was first formed and questioned. It is from Prussian universities, and above all the University of Berlin, that such an idea spread, especially to Britain and North America. As a consequence – though also because the field of theology in the nineteenth century is so vast – there are only passing references to those other places and the theologies that developed in them. There are only passing references to what is undoubtedly one of the key nineteenth-century texts to address the question of theology in the university, namely, John Henry Newman's *The Idea of a University* (1873).<sup>2</sup> There are interesting differences and similarities between Newman's conception of theology and that which developed in the German universities, and there are equally fascinating similarities and differences between Oxford and Berlin, not the least of which is that there was no undergraduate course in theology at Oxford before 1870. There was, however, theology, with professors in the subject, but only because students were required to show knowledge of divinity – of the Gospels in Greek, the Thirty Nine Articles of Religion, and

Bishop Butler's *Analogy of Religion* (1736) – if they were to obtain a BA, and because most of them were contemplating a career in the church (Chapman 2014: 46).

Theology persisted and developed in the course of the nineteenth century, responding to the political, economic and social changes that transformed society. However, there are those who, while acknowledging theology's persistence, question its identity: the form remained the same, but the substance changed. One such person is Gavin D'Costa, who thinks that theology is now but a masquerade (2005: 20), and it is by way of his reading of theology in the university that we will move our consideration from the end to the beginning of the long nineteenth century. We will then consider the development of theology in the German university, the relationship of the university to the state, the proliferation of subjects in the university, and the relationship between prayer and university theology. We will finally consider the supposed eclipse of theology by religious studies and the secularisation of university and theology.

D'Costa starts his study of *Theology in the Public Square* by likening the place of theology in the modern university to that of Israel in Babylon; a place where theology, 'properly understood, cannot be taught and practiced' (ibid. 1). He cites two people – Richard Dawkins and Donald Wiebe – who think that theology should not be taught in the university, which is a rather weaker claim than D'Costa's own. The latter – which can be rendered more personally: that D'Costa cannot teach theology proper in his own University of Bristol<sup>3</sup> – is advanced for a number of reasons. First, the university is no longer where it was, for it no longer exists under a 'sacred canopy'; and second, it no longer has an 'organic vision' of its disciplines, nor a common understanding of what is good and true (ibid. 2).<sup>4</sup> Kafton's fear of a fragmented university has come to pass. For D'Costa, the university has changed throughout its history, increasingly becoming a less comfortable place for theology – or theology proper. There are a number of periods in which these changes occurred, but the 'nineteenth century was the decisive turning point' (ibid. 5). And the decisive turning point in the nineteenth century was the creation of the University of Berlin in 1810.

## Berlin

The University of Berlin was founded in the shadow of the French Revolution and then of Napoleon's invasion of Prussia and defeat of its army at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806. The new university was an assertion of Prussian values in the face of military defeat,<sup>5</sup> but also the fruition of reformist tendencies in the Prussian state itself. Many saw a need for civil institutions that would better serve the interests of the state than had the old universities, with their debauched and riotous students. Indeed, the extensively named Julius Eberhard Wilhelm Ernst von Massow (1750–1816), minister of state with responsibilities for universities, wanted to follow the French example and get rid of universities altogether, replacing them with technical colleges. The French revolutionaries had closed the University of Paris in 1793, and it was not until the ascent of Napoleon (self-crowned emperor in 1804) that a new system of higher education began to emerge in France. This separated research from teaching, establishing institutions such as the Collège de France for the former and from 1808 a new Université impériale for the latter. A few faculties of Catholic theology reopened under Napoleon, but they were tied to the state and so shunned by the church.

It was Karl Friedrich Beyme (1765–1832) who was to take forward the development of the university at Berlin, and while he was leery of the name, he was also influenced by those who imagined the university a place for thinking rather than training. Beyme sought guidance from J. W. H. Nolte (1767–1832) on whom to approach for the teach-

ing of theology, and it was Nolte who suggested Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), newly fled from Halle to Berlin. Schleiermacher had moved because of the closing of Halle University, and he greeted enthusiastically the prospect of a new post within a new university. The fruit of this enthusiasm was the publication in 1808 of his *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn* [Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense] ([1808] 1991).

Beyme was not to see his project through to completion. That honour fell to Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), who took over from the interim figure of Karl Freiherr von Stein. Humboldt became the first Head of the new Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Education, and it was he who finally got the King to found the university in 1809, with its first senate meeting in the following year, on the tenth day of the tenth month, a few days after its first students heard their first lectures. It was also Humboldt who decided to retain the old name of ‘university’ for the new undertaking in Berlin. It was to be the university reborn.

There were those – such as J. B. Erhard (1766–1827) – who thought that theology should have no place in the new university (Erhard 1802). Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) also thought it should be removed from the academy, becoming a practical rather than a scientific art, with pastors trained in other institutions. To remain in the university as a scientific art, theology would have to give up its ‘claim to the sole knowledge of secrets and charms, frankly explaining and openly acknowledging that the will of God can be known without any special revelation’ ([1807] 1956: 155). Scientific theology would become a merely historical study, eschewing the speculative and interpretative. Indeed, Fichte thought that a scientific theology could be housed within history. It did not need its own faculty.

However, in Berlin’s early years, it was Schleiermacher, rather than Fichte, whose ideas of theology and the university were to prevail. Schleiermacher was more respectful of the university’s older forms. He retained the name of university, and was suspicious of the French stress on the technical over the speculative. Yet he was also committed to *Wissenschaft*, and to philosophy as the ‘lord’ (*Herrin*) of the other disciplines. But more importantly, he maintained the connection between speculative science and practical outcome, insisting that practical theology – on the ministrations of the church – was the culmination of a theological education, the ‘crown’ of both philosophical and historical theology, as he wrote in the first edition of his *Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study* ([1811] 2011: 12, §31). Theology is a practical science, like law and medicine. In this way, Schleiermacher kept together what Fichte would have sundered.

The university was to be a place for research and teaching, where students would learn to learn – *das Lernen des Lernens* (Schleiermacher 1980: I/4: 35) – and come to understand the unity of knowledge and the power of the science by which it is brought to light. Students would be encouraged to become researchers themselves, but first and most importantly they were to learn the ‘unity and connectedness of all knowledge’ (Schleiermacher [1808] 1956: 245). Yet while *Wissenschaft* seeks the whole of knowledge, the whole of knowledge can never be wholly found, but is, as Schleiermacher’s colleague, Wilhelm von Humboldt, wrote in an unpublished memorandum of 1809, ‘always to be searched for’ ([1809] 1956: 379). For Humboldt, both teaching and research were subordinate to the furthering of *Wissenschaft*, which was never finished, but always pushing on. Schools teach what is known, but the university seeks the unknown. ‘This difference completely changes the relationship between teacher and student. . . . [T]he teacher no longer exists for the sake of the student; both exist for the sake of *Wissenschaft*’ (ibid. 377–8).

## State of Knowledge

Both Humboldt and Schleiermacher wrestled with the relationship between the university and the state, coming to recognise the involvement of the latter as a necessary evil, since it alone could provide the infrastructure for a university in pursuit of *Wissenschaft*. Yet the latter – the pursuit of a knowledge never fully to be attained – requires a freedom that the state will always resent and seek to circumvent. But the granting of such freedom serves the state, since the fruits of the university benefit all. It is a matter of ‘freedom from the state for the sake of the state’ (Higton 2012: 69). Nevertheless, tensions between government and academia would persist throughout the century and are to be found wherever universities are publicly funded. Such tensions are also found in private institutions, when the funders are not also the academics.

The one aspect of Humboldt’s programme that now seems perplexing and proved problematic at the time was his suggestion that the state, and not the university, should appoint the professors. It would seem that though Humboldt had a high regard for what professors did, he had a low view of those doing it, and seemed to have imagined that state ministers would rise above the petty squabbles of the professoriate. Needless to say, the state proved less wise than Humboldt hoped, its commitment to *Wissenschaft* less secure than its interest in political gain and advancement.

In 1817, Karl Sigmund Franz von Altenstein (1757–1840) became chief of the newly established Ministry of Culture (Kultusministerium), from which position he continued to reshape Prussian universities in line with Berlin. The purpose of theology in the university was the training of clergy. ‘A learned character is deeply embedded in the character of Protestantism. It is the surest means of maintaining an able clergyman; only serious intellectual activity keeps one vital and protects against indolence’ (Altenstein, quoted in Howard 2006: 246).

It was under Altenstein that the University of Bonn was established in 1818, a Prussian outpost in a largely Catholic region, that as a consequence was established with two theological faculties, Protestant and Catholic. Though resisted by the Catholic hierarchy, the Catholic faculty – under Georg Hermes (1775–1831) – was for a time a centre for Catholic liberalism.<sup>6</sup> As with Hermes, the Protestant professors appointed by Altenstein were committed to developing a scientific theology, along Schleiermacherian lines. In the same year that Bonn was founded, Altenstein successfully persuaded Hegel, then but newly arrived in Heidelberg, to take up Fichte’s chair in Berlin. There Hegel’s responsibility for *Wissenschaft*, as Altenstein put it, could be exercised to its fullest extent.

Altenstein – along with Johannes Schulz (1786–1870) – worked tirelessly to promote the university as the home of *Wissenschaft*, its different disciplines unified by philosophy’s commitment to the unity of knowledge; hence the importance of securing Hegel for Berlin. Perhaps more importantly, Altenstein worked tirelessly to increase the number and quality of professors in the universities. The Prussian professoriate, between 1800 and 1830, grew by a remarkable 147 per cent (Howard 2006: 251). At the University of Berlin, between 1820 and 1840, the number of theology students increased by 146 per cent, and their professors by 66 per cent (ibid. 252). However, it should be noted that in other parts of the university, the increase in professors outstripped that of students, a pattern that would be accentuated at the end of the century, as the prestige of other sciences grew at the expense of theology, with its scientific nature increasingly in doubt. Nevertheless, for Altenstein, theology was at the heart of the university, albeit an idealist theology that would serve a church bound ever more closely to the state, as was the university itself. It

was said of Altenstein that all that mattered for him was 'scientific excellence irrespective of theological colour or party' (Tholuck, quoted in Howard 2006: 260). And this marks him as a harbinger of the university to come, the university of excellence, as lauded by Stanley Fish (2005, 2008). Or to put it the other way, it shows us that the research universities of the twenty-first century – seeking the academic stars of the day and rewarding 'output' and 'impact' – repeat those of the nineteenth. These are universities where – as for both Altenstein and Fish – theology can flourish so long as it does what it does excellently.

Thomas Howard (2006: 297–8) argues that by the end of the nineteenth century the state had so annexed the university that it could be thought a *Wissenschaftsstat*, with Protestantism the catch-all for the modern values of 'freedom, progress, and scientific inquiry', opposed to those of Catholic medievalism. Moreover, appointments to faculty positions were now firmly in the gift of the state, of the minister for education. The nature of the relationships between the Prussian state, Protestant church and university at the end of the nineteenth century is well indicated by the case of Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), in his opposition to the appointment of Martin Spahn (1875–1945) to a Chair at the University of Strasbourg, and in the opposition of others to Harnack's own appointment at the University of Berlin.

Alsace was still coming to terms with its annexation by Germany, when, in 1901, the minister for education, Friedrich Althoff (1839–1908), decided to inaugurate a Catholic professorship within the University of Strasbourg as a way of enticing the Catholic population of Alsace to think better of German learning. But his appointment of Spahn drew the ire of those who did not think confessional allegiance consonant with the ideals of a university pursuing disinterested research. One of those who protested was Harnack, who in a public letter reminded the government of its duty to protect 'the sanctuary of the university from the disturbing encroachment of confessional and related forces' ([1901] 1984: 155). Harnack himself had been the beneficiary of the state's high-handedness in making professorial appointments against the wishes of other interested parties. For it was indeed Althoff who had, in 1888, brought Harnack to Berlin from Marburg against the wishes of many in the church who doubted Harnack's orthodoxy. Althoff argued that 'the freedom of scientific inquiry would be undermined and the standing of the theological faculties diminished' if these concerns were to prevail (Althoff, quoted in Howard 2006: 300).

## Proliferation

Gavin D'Costa, among others, laments the fragmentation of knowledge in the modern university, a loss of the whole that he follows Prudence Allen (1985) in tracing back to the founding of the University of Paris in the thirteenth century, and the creation of its faculties. But needless to say, this splintering of subjects was made definitive in the University of Berlin, the place where theology was finally 'toppled' (D'Costa 2005: 19), though – as we have seen – such fragmentation was but in prospect for Max Lenz at the end of the long nineteenth century. And for Lenz theology was still standing, perhaps a little too sturdily.

The fragmentation of knowledge was very far from being in prospect at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the University of Berlin was founded upon the opposite expectation, with its originators looking to an ever fuller and more cohesive ordering of knowledge. Their grounding texts (*Grundschriften*), which informed the aspirations if not always the practice of the new university, were saturated with an idealist philosophy that assumed the unity of human thought, and the possibility of its comprehension and

articulation. Thus F. W. J. Schelling, in his *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* of 1803, argued for the organic unity of the sciences, and urged that the vision of this unity was vouchsafed to philosophy, 'the science of all science' – *Wissenschaft aller Wissenschaft* ([1803] 1956: 6).

For Schelling, all other sciences, including theology, were positive sciences (*positive Wissenschaft*), aimed at particular goods – eternal life in the case of theology, security in regard to law, and health in relation to medicine. The university serves to produce pastors, lawyers, doctors, 'instruments of the state', but does so through the disinterested pursuit of their respective sciences, pursued for their own sake and yet thereby achieving the good of a scientific state (*Wissenschaftsstat*), a state devoted to disinterested truth (ibid. 17).

There was no fragmentation of knowledge here. Of course, the key to this unity was philosophy and not theology, though theology was a 'higher' faculty in traditional schema. Philosophy was now the faculty to rule the historically higher faculties of theology, law and medicine. Philosophy might have been ranked lower than these other disciplines, but it was now the one that led into them and ordered them. This idea was also propounded by Schleiermacher, for whom philosophy was a lower faculty in the sense of being the foundation for all the rest, the underlying and unifying point of each: 'Everyone must first of all be a student of philosophy' ([1808] 1956: 260).

When Fichte came to imagine the university he did so by invoking philosophy as the one discipline that could realise the unity of knowledge. And the means for expressing this unified knowledge was the encyclopedia, the 'circle of knowledge' as the name properly intends. As such, the encyclopedia was not a mere accumulation of knowledge, a list of names and topics, but a systematic introduction to the sciences, to their relationships and unity. The encyclopedia, as Schleiermacher said of the true scholar, shows 'the whole in every particular and every particular only in the whole' (ibid. 230).

No less than the inspirers and architects of Berlin, so John Henry Newman (1801–99), in his reflections on *The Idea of a University* (1873), insisted on the unity of the sciences, the university as the place where they are taught, and on philosophy as the ruling science, the 'science of sciences', as if echoing Schelling ([1873] 1996: 45). For Newman, 'all knowledge forms one whole because its subject-matter is one', namely, the 'universe in its length and breadth', which must include the Creator, who, 'while infinitely separate from it', is also so implicit in it, 'that we cannot truly or fully contemplate it without in some main aspects contemplating Him' (ibid. 45). Newman was fully aware that there were those who doubted or denied the existence of a Creator, but while offering some considerations in defence, he for the most part relied on the incredulity of his audience towards such beliefs to venture that natural theology – to say nothing of revelation – establishes itself as a science equal to any other.<sup>7</sup> 'Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge. University Teaching without Theology is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as Astronomy' (ibid. 40).<sup>8</sup>

It was not, then, the arrival of *Wissenschaft* and the encircling of knowledge in the encyclopedia that led to the fragmentation of knowledge and the diminishing of theology in the university. For *Wissenschaft*, as first conceived, was the child of an idealist desire for a unified knowledge that repeated differently the earlier medieval pursuit of the whole.<sup>9</sup> That ideal persisted in what became a monumental, though not enduring, achievement of nineteenth-century German university theology. This was the theological encyclopedia, which like the general one, was not – as already noted – an alphabetical listing of topics, but a comprehensive encircling of theological knowledge. It was a form that began



to develop in the eighteenth century (see Purvis 2016: 60–3), but was most enduringly achieved in Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* of 1811 ([1811] 1910), which he comprehensively revised in 1830, and which was first translated into English by William Farrer as *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology* (1850).<sup>10</sup> There were numerous such works produced throughout the nineteenth century, and – as Farrer's translation indicates – they had an effect beyond the German-speaking world, where however they were never fully naturalised.

Within Germany, Schleiermacher's work was highly influential, and not only in Protestant circles but also Catholic, inspiring the work of the Tübingen scholar, Johann Sebastian Drey (1777–1853).<sup>11</sup> More importantly, Schleiermacher inspired the *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaft* (1833) of Karl Rudolf Hagenbach (1801–74). This work – which was dedicated to de Wette and Schleiermacher – propelled the ideal of a unified, scientifically ordered theology through the course of the nineteenth century, being translated into several languages and going through twelve editions by 1889. Thomas Howard compares its 'pedagogical success' to that of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in the medieval period (Howard 2006: 311).

Hagenbach taught at the University of Basle, where he worked tirelessly to make the university and theology fully scientific in the Prussian sense. His encyclopedia aimed to make Schleiermacher's thought more accessible to 'beginning students of theology' (Hagenbach 1833: 1). Apart from striving for the unity of theological knowledge – the theological encyclopedia being part of the general encyclopedia – Hagenbach's book also established the fourfold division of theology into exegesis, historical and systematic theology, and practical theology, and it promoted theology's historicisation, the realisation that theology is as much prone to historical happenstance as any other subject. Like Schleiermacher, Hagenbach insisted that practical theology was the crowning moment in theological progress, the point at which theology became directly relevant in serving the church. But the preceding scientific stages were required. 'Only that theologian who has passed through a preliminary scientific training . . . is qualified to dispose and utilize the possession he has acquired' (ibid. 363–4).

If the medieval scholar sought the unity of God's mind, early promoters of *Wissenschaft* thought the human mind – individual human minds – could encompass all knowledge. But it quickly became apparent that such knowledge could at best be held by a community.<sup>12</sup> As the sciences proliferated, becoming more specialised, so the ideal of *Wissenschaft* became more positivistic, more concerned with the one small domain that any particular science was given to know, but to know it objectively, without contamination by the knowing mind. The ideal of knowing all did not go away, but it was postponed: 'perpetual striving for unity came to matter most, not unity itself, which receded as quickly as scholars approached it' (Howard 2006: 278). This new approach was not necessarily opposed to the earlier, more idealist notion of human thought in its unity, for it could be understood as a necessary process within the coming to be of that unity, within a wider movement of human thought towards its telos. It is an idea that perhaps persists today in the fantasy of the 'theory of everything', of a science that someday will know the mind of God.

There were a number of different forces that worked to bring about a more positivistic *Wissenschaft*. One was the rise of philology, the careful, meticulous study of ancient texts, including those of the Bible. Philology sought to establish their origins, the course of their transmission, their errors and contradictions. Everything was to be proved, nothing assumed. The church's Scriptures were to be treated like any other texts,<sup>13</sup> subject to the same degrees of suspicion and criticism (*Kritik*).<sup>14</sup> One of the early and most

influential proponents of the science was Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), teaching at the University of Halle. Nietzsche would later hail him as having ‘freed his profession from the bonds of theology’ ([1875] 1988: 8:68). Wolf did not admit to his seminar those training for the ministry, for the truth they were seeking in Scripture was not the truth he had to offer.

But more than philology itself, it was its attitude to texts that was most influential, as this approach spread into historical studies and indeed theology. It was an attitude of painstaking research, one that sought to know a given subject ever more precisely, in ever greater depth, and so was ever more excluding of the generalist. In this way, specialisation occurred across the university, creating divisions between subjects and within them. A fragmentation of knowledge was perceived at the time and subsequently.<sup>15</sup> But in truth it was not the fragmentation of a previous unity but the making and proliferation of ever new knowledges, which might yet have a unity, not in the present but in the future, not in the knowing subject but in the object known.

Another factor in the rise of ever more specific disciplines was the decline of an earlier natural philosophy, *Naturphilosophie*, which was replaced by newer natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*). This development came to Germany from France and Great Britain, where an interest in natural theology led to the promotion of natural science by Christian ministers, keen to find in nature evidence of the Deity who had made it (Turner 2014: 106). St David’s College, Lampeter, was one of the first places in Great Britain to have a Chair of Natural Philosophy and Chemistry from 1828 onwards, though quite who, if anyone, filled it is obscure (Price 1977: 55). But it was in the same year that Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) returned from France to Germany, bringing with him, in the words of Rudolf Virchow (1769–1859), an interest in ‘sober observation and common sense’, marking a ‘transition to the time of the natural sciences’ for German *Wissenschaft* (Virchow, quoted in Howard 2006: 282).

We have already noted the centrality that philosophy came to enjoy as the unifying science, and its prestige was further enhanced when it became the means to a career in secondary education. A university education became mandatory for all who wished to teach in a Gymnasium, and students passing the newly introduced *Arbitur*, the final examination of the Gymnasium, were entitled to a place at a Prussian university. Thus the faculty of philosophy became more attractive than theology for those pursuing an educational rather than ecclesial career. And in time, the increase in numbers, and in subjects covered by philosophy, led to the division of the faculty. This was resisted in Berlin for longer than elsewhere. Faculties of natural science were created at Tübingen in 1863, at Strasbourg in 1872, followed by Munich in 1873, Heidelberg in 1890 and Freiburg in 1909 (Howard 2006: 283–5). New faculties, with new departments, and attendant research institutions and laboratories, required new buildings, and so new separations of colleagues, architectural as well as intellectual. This burgeoning proliferation could be seen as splintering and fragmentation, the loss of that unity at the heart of *Wissenschaft*, and of an earlier theological coherence, rooted in the world’s createdness.

To think knowledge fragmented is to suppose that there was once a unified knowledge, now lost to us. But such a knowledge never existed. Instead we find a history of proliferation, of new knowledges emerging from old, appearing through sidesteps from previous domains, repeating them differently, newly. Thus it was imagined, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that encyclopedic learning, in the sense already explored, would lead students to actively engage and not passively receive, and so intensify and extend the circle of knowledge, and this is what happened in the course of the century.

To invoke a fragmented knowledge – a proliferation of knowledges – is not to advocate a fragmented university. On the contrary, it is to imagine a community brought together through its commitment to know the whole it can know only in parts. On this reading, we should embrace the university vouchsafed by the nineteenth century. But this university is not Babylon, the ‘Berlin-Babylonian university’ that holds theology ‘captive’ (D’Costa 2005: 215). Nor is it Troy that theology must take from within (ibid. 217). It is rather the university as imagined by Newman, when he imagined the city, the metropolis – London or Paris – as a virtual university: ‘The newspapers, magazines, reviews, journals, and periodicals of all kinds, the publishing trade, the libraries, museums, and academies there found, the learned and scientific societies, necessarily invest [the city] with the functions of a University’ ([1872] 1909: 13; see further Loughlin 2011).

## Prayer

An American observer of German university theology, Edward Robinson (1794–1863), was both impressed by the rigour of German *Wissenschaft* and dismayed by its impiety. Professors and students alike seemed ‘destitute of any personal religion’ (Robinson 1831: 211).<sup>16</sup> Robinson was also dismayed by the interference of the state in the life of the universities. Robinson went to Germany in 1826, and attended the universities of Berlin, Göttingen and Halle, before returning to the United States in 1830 with his German wife. Similar admiration and disdain was expressed by the Swiss theologian Philip Schaff (1819–93), who emigrated to the United States in 1844. Like Robinson, he extolled the separation of church and state in his adopted country, but also praised the freedom enjoyed by German theologians in pursuit of their studies, even when this freedom resulted in absurd impieties (Schaff 1857: 105ff.). He held that the proper response was not to deny *Wissenschaft*, but to embrace it, pass through its investigations and so ‘come out more firmly grounded in orthodoxy than before’ (Schaff 1847: 512–13).

These observations, from the first half of the nineteenth century, appear to confirm the view that when theology became more scientific – became *wissenschaftliche Theologie* – it became less ecclesial, less situated within practices of prayer and contemplation appropriate for an undertaking that is often acknowledged, after Anselm, as faith seeking understanding. Theology without prayer is also said to be less humble and more presumptuous, for only a ‘prayerful theology “declines the attempt to take God’s point of view (i.e. a ‘total perspective’)”’ (D’Costa 2005: 114–15, quoting Williams 1991: 143). Gavin D’Costa argues that theology only flourishes when undertaken by virtuous people who pray and enjoy the sacramental life of the church (ibid. 5, 19). Prayer is an ‘epistemological requirement’ for theology, an ‘indispensable prerequisite’, along with virtue, for the study of God and church (ibid. 123, 126).<sup>17</sup>

D’Costa quotes the Anglican Newman on Mary as a model of the theologian (ibid. 131–2):<sup>18</sup>

St Mary is our pattern of Faith, both in the reception and in the study of Divine Truth. She does not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon it; not enough to possess, she uses it; not enough to assent, she develops [sic] it; not enough to submit the Reason, she reasons upon it; not indeed reasoning first, and believing afterwards, with Zacharias, yet first believing without reasoning, next from love and reverence, reasoning after believing. And thus she symbolizes to us, not only the faith of the unlearned, but of the doctors of the Church also. (Newman [1872] 2006: 211–12)

But it is important to note that while Newman does not doubt that the theologian will have faith, he also distinguishes that faith from reasoning about it, which is the work of the 'doctors of the Church', who

have to investigate, and weigh, and define, as well as to profess the Gospel; to draw the line between truth and heresy; to anticipate or remedy the various aberrations of wrong reason; to combat pride and recklessness with their own arms; and thus to triumph over the sophist and the innovator. (Ibid. 212; see further Loughlin 2011: 226–7)

For Newman, reason will not bring you to faith, but faith will invite you to reason about it, and so such reasoning is distinguishable from faith. Newman's own discussion of the nature and relationship of faith and reason is itself an example of such reasoning.<sup>19</sup>

Can we consider prayer and virtue causative and not merely correlative of (some) *academic* theology? As D'Costa notes, prayer is no substitute for 'intellectual rigor and accountability' and will not magically provide what comes from the 'painful, laborious slog of research' (2005: 114). But if no substitute, is prayer yet necessary for the rigours and labour of theology? Does it tutor humility and guard against idolatry? And then, if we think it desirable or even necessary, must we think it required of the formal structures and culture of the university, as opposed to the lives of individual theologians, who need not leave prayer at the door when they enter the university, but nor need parade it in their teaching and academic endeavours? Finally, we must consider whether the university of the nineteenth century, the German university, and above all the university of Berlin, was somehow the place where an earlier tradition of contemplative theology came to ruin.

It seems unlikely that prayer in and of itself leads to good theology. We need only recall the acrimony of theological disagreement both within and outside the university, the willingness of opponents to call down anathemas on one another, developing theologies in justification, and praying for the enemy's defeat. In 1860, the publication of *Essays and Reviews* – a collection of essays in liberal theology by six priests and one layman – led to the trial of two of its clerical contributors (Rowland Williams and H. B. Wilson) on charges of heresy, and for another contributor – Benjamin Jowett – to decry the 'abominable system of terrorism' unleashed by the orthodox (Abbott and Campbell 1897: 1:275).<sup>20</sup> Of course, one might say that good theology requires the right kind of contemplative prayer, the wordless 'deep prayer' of which Sarah Coakley writes in this regard (2015: 51). But this is to invoke an attitude rather than the practice of prayer in public. From the evidence there is no reason to think that such prayer will lead to better (or worse) theology and ecclesial polity.

Equally, there is no reason to think that prayer fosters non-presumptive theologies. No one doubts that Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–88) was a prayerful person, and yet his 'kneeling theology' (see Balthasar [1964] 1989: 206–11) seems anything but reticent on the nature of divinity. As Karen Kilby notes, Balthasar 'seems very well to know his way around, to have a view – even sometimes something that seems remarkably like an insider's view – of what happens in the inner life of the Trinity' (2012: 112). Kilby does not find in Balthasar 'anything of the questing, wrestling, dialogical style of the classic works of theology in prayer of an Augustine or Anselm' (ibid. 160), and yet this would seem imperative for theology in the university, where everything is put to the question.

But putting to the question does not mean that prayer has to be driven from the university, for prayer itself puts the one who prays in question. Schleiermacher did not seek

to separate university theology from the life of the church. Both were intimately linked, bonded in ‘an eternal covenant between the living Christian faith and an independent and freely working science, a covenant by the terms of which science is not hindered and faith not excluded’ (Schleiermacher, quoted in Welch 1972: 63). Schleiermacher sought to live this covenant in his own person. For forty years, he preached most Sundays at Trinity Church in Berlin. But he also sought to bring worship within the university, believing that a university church, with a university chaplain leading university worship, would unite church and academy – faith and science – through the common celebration of the Eucharist. This is particularly noteworthy, as Thomas Howard observes, because Berlin is so often presented as the ‘prototype of the modern secular, research university’ (2006: 188).

However, Schleiermacher’s desire to unite the university around the communion table was not realised until after his death, with the holding of the first university service in 1847, and with Karl Immanuel Nitzsch (1787–1868) appointed as the first university chaplain. This office and regular university worship continued until 1870, when both ceased. In 1916, the holding of services returned, but without the office of university chaplain.

Thus the university of Berlin retained the careful distinction between faith and theological science that we find in Newman and, indeed, Thomas Aquinas. But this distinction is also a relationship, since theology answers to the church – as Schleiermacher always maintained – while also retaining its own integrity, answering also to the pursuit of the question, wherever it might lead. Undeniably, there is a tension here, even a diremption in the nature of academic theology: the need to draw close and push away at the same time. We might think it the tension in outlook between Fichte and Schleiermacher. But it would be a mistake to think that at the beginning or ending of the long nineteenth century, Berlin had excluded faith from its pursuit of knowledge, for the possibility of that pursuit was itself held in faith.

While the University of Berlin – in its provisional Schleiermacher-drafted statutes – had no ‘confessional identity’ and promised freedom from censorship for its professors,<sup>21</sup> Clemens Brentano (1778–1842) composed a cantata – ‘Universitati Litterarie’ – to celebrate the opening of the university. It placed the university and its pursuit of *Wissenschaft* under God; dedicated to God’s understanding:

All-knowing God  
 We follow the traces of your understanding,  
 And what we too understand  
 and what we always teach  
 is at root only your Being.  
 The king has established  
 a house of *Wissenschaft*,  
 [And] we men stand bound  
 under his grace and strength.  
 God, bless our desires,  
 Let us fulfil the promise . . .  
 to teach the truth faithfully.  
 (Quoted in Howard 2006: 180)

## The Science of Religion

Newman, in *The Idea of a University*, warns that 'You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine' ([1873] 1996: 29). Today we might be a little surprised to think divinity part of secular knowledge. But Newman is talking of natural theology, which he calls the 'science of Religion'. His usage of 'science' now startles, but at the time it was fully consonant with that of his German contemporaries. But a different science of religion would begin to prevail by the end of the nineteenth century.

The fate that awaits theology in the modern university is to become the study of religion or 'religious studies'.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, perhaps it is a fate that has befallen theology already, since D'Costa suspects that very little would change if overnight departments of theology were to become religious studies departments (2005: 21).<sup>23</sup> While D'Costa allows that there may be more than one way to study religion, more than one methodology or set of them, he nevertheless focuses on the phenomenology of Ninian Smart as paradigmatic of what religious studies is about, while yet noting that 'few today follow Smart' (ibid. 21). The phenomenon of religion is to be studied from a neutral, though empathetic, standpoint, from outside the religion in question, and without any consideration of its claims to articulate the world aright. One must bracket one's own beliefs and practices so as to adopt an impartial approach to the object of one's study, which can be observed all the more clearly for such bracketing. It is of course this ideal of objectivity – of the view from nowhere – that marks Smart's phenomenology as a thoroughly nineteenth-century undertaking, since it is an ideal that had developed within the tradition of *Wissenschaft*.

The advent of religious studies in the 1960s was really the repristination of an earlier appearing, namely, the science of religions – *Religionswissenschaft* – that developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In part it developed in response to those – such as Paul de Lagarde (1827–91) and Franz Overbeck (1837–1905) – who renewed the call of Fichte from earlier in the century for the removal of theology from the university. Though theology had become *wissenschaftliche Theologie*, it still retained relations with revelation and church, with the particularity of the Christian tradition and its claim to witness the truth of the world's creator in creation. But the claims – the worldviews – of other ancient and contemporary religious traditions were increasingly known and studied; and increasingly Christianity was seen as but one among them. *Religionswissenschaft* was an inherently German development, but oddly not so much in Germany as through the German emigré, Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900).

It was as the Taylorian Professor of Languages at the University of Oxford (appointed 1854) that Müller made his mark as a Sanskritist, while helping to establish *Religionswissenschaft* through a series of lectures given at the London Institute in 1870 and published in 1873 as an *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. Here he announced the

duty of those who have devoted their life to the study of the principal religions of the world in their original documents, and who value religion and reverence it in whatever form it may present itself, to take possession of this new territory in the name of true science. (1873: 34)

Christianity too, should be subject to 'true science', studied as but one religion among others. And Müller's call was heeded. Chairs in the history of religion were established in the following years across Europe (Uppsala in 1878, the Collège de France in 1880,

Brussels in 1884) and in the United States (Cornell in 1891, Chicago in 1892). The one country where such chairs did not so readily emerge was Germany, though the subject was being pursued there by an increasing number of individuals. One of their number was Lagarde, who in 1873, published an essay calling on faculties of confessional theology to give way to ones of comparative religion, a historical discipline that would seek the truth in all traditions, with no privilege accorded Christianity. In this way, Lagarde argued, a truly Germanic religion would be discerned.

Gavin D'Costa replays hopes and fears from the end of the nineteenth century when he argues that theology has become too much like religious studies. Franz Overbeck charged theology with losing its soul in becoming *wissenschaftliche Theologie*. In so doing, it destroyed Christianity. Scientific theologians were 'traitors', their theology the 'Satan of religion' ([1873] 1981: 236). However, unlike D'Costa, and others today who would be equally scathing of scientific theology,<sup>24</sup> Overbeck thought that Christianity had an 'aversion to science' because Christianity was an eschatological, world-denying faith ([1919] 1963: 22). 'World-denial is the innermost soul of Christianity' (ibid. 91). Only secluded monastics live the true faith. Though having lost his own faith, Overbeck taught theology at the University of Basle, where he had become good friends with Friedrich Nietzsche,<sup>25</sup> who encouraged Overbeck's thinking and the publication of his *Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie*. Needless to say, Overbeck's denunciations of liberal theology – then regnant at the University of Berlin – hampered the success of the comparative religion he advocated.

Another reason why *Religionswissenschaft* fared less well in Germany than elsewhere was a continuing loyalty to the nature and place of theology in the university that Schleiermacher had established at the start of the century. Harnack's rectoral address of 1901 to the University of Berlin gave both expression and renewed impetus to that inheritance. In 'The Task of the Theological Faculties and the General History of Religion', Harnack carefully considered the call for the advance of *Religionswissenschaft* over *wissenschaftliche Theologie*, but concluded that matters should remain as they were. Christianity should retain its pre-eminence in the theological faculty because Christianity was pre-eminent among the religions. The faculty should continue to serve the church but only because it had first served *Wissenschaft* without let or hindrance from the church. At the same time, *Religionswissenschaft*, which needed to draw on so many other disciplines to fully understand the religions it studied, would find a better home in the faculty of philosophy.

Thus, theology's full ruination was postponed until at least the second half of the twentieth century. But there is an irony in D'Costa's diagnosis of theology's present predicament, one that again echoes themes from the end of the nineteenth century. For the very thing that ruins theology – religious studies – has itself come to ruin. For it was always a fallacy – in the nineteenth century or the 1960s – to suppose that there could be a neutral standing point, outside of all tradition and cultural presumption. The bracketing of belief was always the bracketing of the other as 'other', the assumption of a cultural superiority. There was nothing neutral about the stance of objectivity, and the view from nowhere was always from somewhere, though unacknowledged. This became increasingly apparent towards the end of the twentieth century, as the theory and culture of postmodernity took hold in the humanities and social sciences, with inroads into the natural also. As D'Costa notes, these disciplines 'have tended to eschew objectivity and neutrality, and increasingly acknowledge that the role of the investigator and his or her socio-political location is crucial to the production of knowledge' (2005: 25). But where does this leave theology, and D'Costa's argument about it?

According to Gavin Hyman, the arrival of postmodernity has unexpectedly benefited theology. It is no longer possible to criticise theology for its commitment to particular axioms – narratives of revelation – for now all disciplines have to acknowledge a similar partiality (Hyman 2004: 196–7; see also Loughlin 1998). All are founded upon unfounded principles. As Ludwig Wittgenstein long ago observed, one can be persuaded for or against such principles, but there are none more basic that can adjudicate between them (Wittgenstein [1969] 1975: 81e, §612). This puts religious studies and theology on the same level, and one can no longer usurp the other, or if it can, it is now a returning theology that seeks the rout of religious studies, or at least religious studies as envisaged by Smart (Hyman 2004: 202–3).<sup>26</sup> But then it would seem that theology is no longer captive in the way that D'Costa has proposed. And this would seem to be the case from much earlier, from the ending of the nineteenth century.

The long nineteenth century came to grief in the disasters of the First World War, in the trenches of the Somme. And there died also the theology of people like Adolf von Harnack, the *wissenschaftliche Theologie* that he had so persuasively defended in 1901. At least it died for people like Karl Barth (1886–1968), who, as often retold, turned his back on a science that had not prevented his teachers, Harnack and others, from endorsing the Kaiser and his war. But this did not mean that theology succumbed to the *Religionswissenschaft* that so many thought should take its place. It meant the return of the very kind of theology that Overbeck had thought overcome; a theology that was not entirely world-denying but certainly world-judging, rooted in revelation. From his reading of Overbeck's posthumous *Christentum und Kultur*, Barth embraced eschatology as the truth of Christianity, but a truth that was not obsolete, as Overbeck had thought, but a challenge to the present, including the present church. Moreover, as well as developing a dialectical theology that scandalised Harnack, making him fear for the place of scientific theology in the university, Barth went on to build a highly successful career as a theologian, and did so within the university – first at Göttingen, then at Münster and Bonn, and finally at Basle. Barth maintained a commitment to theology in the secular university that D'Costa rejects (albeit having found a home there himself), a commitment to the sort of theology that D'Costa thinks impossible in such a place.<sup>27</sup> It is to D'Costa's alternative to such a university that we now turn in order to find again a nineteenth-century predecessor.

## Sects

D'Costa sketches three possible futures for the study of theology in the university. The first sees theology (and religious studies) dissipated into other disciplines – into history, literature or anthropology. The second future sees religion retained as the subject of a specific discipline, but one that is now entirely religious studies, a purely socio-historical study. And then there is the third future – the one that D'Costa champions – which sees theology not dissipated or subsumed, but dispersed, like the dragon's teeth strewn by Cadmus and Jason, with new and diverse departments springing up everywhere in equally diverse universities. Theology needs to get out of the secular university and into Christian ones, and not just Christian ones, but denominational universities – Anglican, Baptist, Catholic, Methodist, Orthodox. In each, theology will flourish according to the tradition it serves.

It is only in a Christian university that theology can be theology. In such a university, it is not questioned but supported by 'liturgies, upright lives and committed staff' (D'Costa 2005: 216). It is only in a Catholic university that theology can be properly Catholic;



only in an Anglican that it can be properly Anglican; and so on. If theology is otherwise placed, in a secular university, it will become secular theology.<sup>28</sup> For all learning is tradition-specific, and the secular is one such tradition, as sectarian as any other (ibid. 217). Its secularity will seep into the bone of the theology it harbours.

The problem of sectarianism, of different Christianities allied with different political interests, has long troubled Ireland, and it was there in the nineteenth century that something like D'Costa's model was suggested but not fully realised. At the beginning of the century, the only Irish university was Dublin, its only college Trinity. Though dissenters and Catholics had been admitted from 1793 onwards, it remained an Anglican – Church of Ireland – institution, and Catholics were discouraged from entering by their bishops.

Thus it was proposed to establish new colleges – the Queen's Colleges – at Belfast and Cork, and later at Galway, which in due course would form a university – Queen's University. However, because of the 'peculiar and unfortunate character of the religious differences' in Ireland, as Sir Robert Peel put it, the colleges were to be secular institutions (Barr 2003: 29). The precedent was the secular University of London, that had come into being in 1836, constituted of University College, established as a secular undertaking in 1828, and King's College, established in opposition as an Anglican institution in 1829, opening in 1831 (ibid. 29–30). While London University was to expand and flourish, the Irish proposal fared less well, being denounced by Sir Robert Inglis as 'a gigantic scheme of godless education' (quoted in McGrath 1951: 44). Inglis opposed the colleges because they were not to be Anglican, while in Ireland they were opposed by some though not all of the Catholic bishops because they were not to be Catholic. They were also opposed by Daniel O'Connell, who – in a speech on 12 May 1845 – outlined what is in effect D'Costa's model for tradition-specific, sectarian universities:

While I ask education for the Catholics, I freely and gladly concede it to the Protestants and Dissenters. . . . Let the Protestants of the Establishment have the full use of Trinity College for the education of their youth. Let the Presbyterians have the completest control over the education of their children in the Belfast institution;<sup>29</sup> but for the purposes of Catholic instruction, let two more colleges be instituted, one at Cork, the other at Galway, and let the Deans of those establishments be Catholic clergyman, whose appointment shall be vested in the Catholic bishop of the Diocese. (O'Connell, quoted in McGrath 1951: 44)

In due course Rome would suggest the establishment of a Catholic university in Dublin (Barr 2003: 39–44), and Newman called to be its first rector (ibid. 63–72). Lecturing in 1852, Newman scorned the idea of Catholics attending a secular university. But in 1864, having left Dublin, he sought to establish an Oratory – an outpost of the Birmingham Oratory that Newman had founded in 1849 – and a hall of residence for Catholics attending the University of Oxford. The Bishop of Birmingham, William Ullathorne (1806–89), gained the approval of Rome for the Oratory, but with the caveat – unknown to Newman – that Newman himself would not move to Oxford: 'the intention was to grant Newman sufficient scope to influence Protestants there, but not enough to attract Catholics' (Shrimpton 2014: 428). It was when this stricture came to public knowledge in 1867, that Newman abandoned the project.<sup>30</sup> The proposed hall of residence had already been rejected by Ullathorne.<sup>31</sup> Of course, Oxford was not then a secular university. But that Newman could promote the idea of Catholics at Oxford suggests the possibility of mixing sects; living as a Catholic in a non-Catholic nation, one can become an educated

Catholic through a non-Catholic university. In such a place, one might even be educated in Catholic theology.<sup>32</sup>

The withdrawal of theology from the secular university seems oddly unevangelical. Given the pious nature of D'Costa's 'theological theology',<sup>33</sup> why would it want to get out of the secular university? Why would it not rather remain for as long as it can, bearing witness to the faith, to a different way of being university; asking the questions that are not otherwise posed? D'Costa affirms that the 'Catholic university must serve the Church, so that [the Church] can serve society' (2005: 215). But might society not be best served by retaining theology within the secular university, within the very place that asks the question of the whole?

The universities of medieval Europe did not need to think themselves Christian universities because they were the universities of a Christian society. To replicate such today is to have secular universities. To have Christian ones is to have something new, a break with tradition. Modern Christian universities can never be Christian in the manner of the medieval Oxford or Paris. At best, they are a pastiche of such institutions. And if society and its universities have become secular, might we not expect and want a secular theology also? Which is to say a theology that can speak in and to a world with a secular rather than a sacred canopy. What use is a theology that speaks only to those huddled beneath their sacred umbrellas, while all around a secular rain is falling?

## Notes

1. The University of Chicago was founded in 1892. It was a Baptist foundation, and funded by John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937). Judson was a historian and served as the second president of the university from 1903–27. For a study of theology at Chicago, see Chapman 2014: 79–98.
2. I have addressed Newman and his idea of the university more fully in Loughlin 2009, 2011.
3. D'Costa notes that this self-reflective quandary – that he teaches theology in a place where it cannot be taught – is 'uncomfortable' (2005: 5). For it is a place where he still has leave to write his books and teach his students that they are 'prisoners to mammon' (ibid. 215).
4. The image of the canopy derives from Peter Berger (1967).
5. The King reportedly approved the proposal to found Berlin by declaring: 'That is right, that is good! The state must replace with intellectual strength what it has lost in material resources' (Köpke 1860: 37).
6. Hermes' theological system – 'Hermesianism' – was condemned by a papal bull of 1835, *Dum acerbissimas*, and Hermes' writings were placed on the Index.
7. Newman expressly states that he does not prove but assumes the existence of a 'Supreme Being'. His chief defence of this assumption, in the *Idea* as elsewhere, is to suggest that the opposite assumption – that there is no supreme being – is equally a matter of belief that begs the question. See Newman [1873] 1996: 50.
8. Newman insisted that theology was as much a science as any other discipline, defining theology as 'the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it astronomy, or one of the crust of the earth, and call it geology' ([1873] 1996: 52).
9. Mike Higon also notes the continuities as well as discontinuities between medieval and enlightenment conceptions of the university. See Higon 2012: 52–4.
10. The most recent translation is by Terrence N. Tice (2011). Of course, the modern systematising of theology may be said to date from the early seventeenth century, with Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572–1608), one of the first to use the term *theologia systematica*.
11. On Drey, see Purvis 2016: 161–2; for theology at Tübingen, see Zachhuber 2013.

12. For an account of the sociality that enabled the ideal and practice of *Wissenschaft*, see Higton 2012: 54–65.
13. Benjamin Jowett (1817–93) notoriously urged readers to ‘interpret the Scripture like any other book’ (Jowett 1860: 458). ‘[I]n the externals of interpretation, that is to say, the meaning of words, the connexion of sentences, the settlement of the text, the evidence of facts, the same rules apply to the Old and New Testaments as to other books’ (ibid. 407–8).
14. For accounts of these approaches in regard to the Old and New Testaments, see Clements 1985; O’Neil 1985.
15. Jacob Burckhardt in 1840: ‘Due to the enormous expansion of *Wissenschaft* one is obliged to limit oneself to some definite subject and pursue it single mindedly’ (quoted in Howard 2006: 277).
16. Mark Chapman observes that ‘through the nineteenth century an often somewhat vague piety was usually sufficient to convince theologians that what they were doing remained theological’ (2014: 17).
17. Sarah Coakley also argues for the necessity of prayer for theology, for ‘if one is resolutely *not* engaged in the practices of prayer, contemplation, and worship, then there are certain sorts of philosophical insight that are unlikely, if not impossible, to become available to one’ (2013: 16). This of course begs the question, since such insights must remain unavailable to anyone not reading Coakley’s book in a prayerful way. Likewise, is prayer necessary for understanding D’Costa’s theological study?
18. Newman left the Church of England for the Church of Rome in 1845.
19. Newman’s distinction between faith and reason, and his refusal to collapse the latter into the former, is long-standing in Christian theology. Thomas Aquinas makes the same distinction between faith (*fides*) and knowledge (*scientia*). In his discussion of Christian theology (*sacra doctrina*), Thomas distinguishes between two kinds of judgement. One is, as it were, intuitive, the judgement of a virtuous person, while the second is arrived at by reasoning, ‘as when a person soundly instructed in moral science can appreciate the activity of virtues he does not himself possess’. In matters of theology, the first is that of the ‘spiritual man’, gifted by the Spirit, while the second is ‘taken by sacred doctrine to the extent that it can be gained by study’ on ‘premises held from revelation’ (Aquinas [1274] 1964: 1a, 1, 6 [p. 25]). The second is the way of theological science, which by implication could be undertaken by people who appreciate the faith they do not themselves possess. D’Costa discusses this passage (2005: 127–8; with unreliable referencing), but focuses on the first kind of judgement, that of the virtuous and spiritual, and makes it more central to Christian theology than I think Thomas requires.
20. On Rowland Williams (1817–70) and H. B. Wilson (1803–88), see Crowther 1970: 82–106, 107–26, respectively. On *Essays and Reviews*, see Chapman 2014: 59–60, 65–77; Crowther 1970: *passim*.
21. These statutes were modified in 1817 to stop professors from speaking on political matters or against the laws of the land, and from 1819 onwards professors had to refrain from anything that might upset the peace and undermine the state. Though not always separated, the concern was with political rather than religious heterodoxy.
22. The term ‘religious studies’ can make (some) theologians shudder. When it was proposed that the Department of Theology at Durham University should change its name to acknowledge the arrival of new colleagues from the former Department of Religious Studies at Newcastle University, it was agreed on condition that the new name should not include the despised term. Thus the Department of Theology and Religion was born in 2004.
23. D’Costa describes the relationship of religious studies to theology as Oedipal, though he also describes theology in this relationship as a ‘dead mother’ (2005: 23), which suggests that we should think more in terms of Electra, with seemingly religion – or even ‘the divine’ – the paternal object of desire, with whom theology had once been sleeping (ibid. 20). Religious studies is now cavorting with religion, and theology is abandoned if not expired or nearly so – a ‘nearly dead mother’ (ibid. 36).

24. See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, who welcomes D'Costa's critique (2007: 181–5).
25. Nietzsche was Professor of Classics at Basle from 1869–78.
26. The setting free of theology in postmodernity is also the setting free of religious studies. Hyman proposes a new kind of religious studies that is betwixt and between how it was and how theology is now. It is a less ideological and more *ad hoc* form of religious studies. See Hyman 2004: 214–17. See also Rogers 2006 for how theology and religious studies benefit each other.
27. It might be noted that Stanley Hauerwas (2007), who reiterates D'Costa on prayer, does not follow D'Costa in removing theology from the secular university. Hauerwas remains closer to Barth in this regard.
28. 'God and such a university cannot coexist', as Newman put it in a letter of 16 April 1851 to Bishop Paul Cullen (quoted in Barr 2003: 87).
29. This was the Belfast Academical Institute, founded in 1810.
30. An Oxford Oratory was eventually established in 1993.
31. The opposition of the English bishops to Catholics going to Oxford led Newman to privately denounce the bishops' 'dreadful jealousy of the laity'. Newman to Thomas Allies (30 November 1864) in Newman 1961–2008: 21:327.
32. The University of Durham was founded as an Anglican institution in 1837, partly in response to the spread of 'Godless' education in London. Today it is a secular university, but with a flourishing Centre for Catholic Studies (2008–) in its Department of Theology and Religion. See further Murray 2013.
33. The term is borrowed from Webster 1998.

## References

- Abbott, Evelyn and Lewis Campbell (1897), *The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett*, 2 vols, London: John Murray.
- Allen, Prudence (1985), *The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution 750 B.C. – A.D. 1250*, Quebec: Eden Press.
- Aquinas, Thomas [1274] (1964), *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 1: *Christian Theology* (1a I), trans. and ed. Thomas Gilby OP, Oxford: Blackfriars.
- Balthasar, Hans Urs von [1964] (1989), 'Theology and Sanctity', in *Explorations in Theology I: The Word Made Flesh*, trans. A. V. Littledale and Alexander Dru, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 181–211.
- Barr, Colin (2003), *Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845–1865*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Berger, Peter L. (1967), *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Social Theory of Religion*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Chapman, Mark D. (2014), *Theology and Society in Three Cities: Berlin, Oxford and Chicago, 1800–1914*, Cambridge: James Clarke.
- Clements, R. E. (1985), 'The Study of the Old Testament', in *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, ed. Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz and Patrick Sherry, vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 109–41.
- Coakley, Sarah (2013), *God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay 'On the Trinity'*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coakley, Sarah (2015), *The New Asceticism: Sexuality, Gender and the Quest for God*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Crowther, M. A. (1970), *Church Embattled: Religious Controversy in Mid-Victorian England*, Newton Abbot: David and Charles.
- D'Costa, Gavin (2005), *Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy and Nation*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Derrida, Jacques [1990] (2004), *Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2*, trans. Jan Plug et al., Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Erhard, Johann Benjamin (1802), *Über die Einrichtung und den Zweck der höhern Lehranstalten*, Berlin: Braun.
- Fichte, Gottfried [1807] (1956), 'Deduzierter Plan einer in Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt', in Ernst Anrich (ed.), *Der Idee der deutschen Universität*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Fish, Stanley (2005), 'Take This Job and Do It: Administering the University without an Idea', *Critical Inquiry*, 31: 271–85.
- Fish, Stanley (2008), *Save the World on Your Own Time*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hagenbach, Karl Rudolf (1833–89), *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaft*, Leipzig: Weidmann.
- Harnack, Adolf von [1901] (1984), 'Letter in *National Zeitung* (28 November 1901)', in John E. Craig, *Scholarship and Nation Building: The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian Society, 1870–1939*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 154–5.
- Hauerwas, Stanley (2007), *The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Higton, Mike (2012), *A Theology of Higher Education*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, Thomas Albert (2006), *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von [1809] (1956), 'Über die innere und äußere Organisation', in Ernst Anrich (ed.), *Der Idee der deutschen Universität*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Hyman, Gavin (2004), 'The Study of Religion and the Return of Theology', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 72.1: 195–219.
- Jowett, Benjamin (1860), 'The Interpretation of Scripture', in *Essays and Reviews*, London: J. W. Parker.
- Kilby, Karen (2012), *Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction*, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
- Köpke, Rudolf (1860), *Die Gründung der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, Berlin: Schade.
- Lenz, Max (1910–18), *Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität zu Berlin*, 4 vols, Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses.
- Loughlin, Gerard (1998), *Telling God's Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Loughlin, Gerard (2009), 'Theology in the University', in *The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman*, ed. Ian Ker and Terrence Merrigan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 221–40.
- Loughlin, Gerard (2011), 'The Wonder of Newman's Education', *New Blackfriars*, 92/1038: 224–42.
- McGrath SJ, Fergal (1951), *Newman's University: Idea and Reality*, London: Longmans, Green.
- Müller, Friedrich Max (1873), *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, London: Longmans, Green.
- Murray, Paul D. (2013), 'The Shaping of Catholic Theology in the UK Public Academy', in *The Vocation of Theology Today: A Festschrift for David Ford*, ed. Tom Greggs, Rachel Muers and Simeon Zahl, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 330–42.
- Newman, John Henry [1872] (1909), 'Rise and Progress of Universities', in *Historical Sketches*, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green, 1–251.
- Newman, John Henry (1961–2008), *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, 32 vols, ed. Charles Stephen Dessain et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, John Henry [1873] (1996), *The Idea of a University*, ed. Frank M. Turner, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Newman, John Henry [1872] (2006), 'The Theory of Development in Religious Doctrine (Sermon XV, 1843)', in *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1843*, ed. James David Earnest and Gerard Tracey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 211–35.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich [1875] (1988), 'Wir Philologen', in *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgi Colli and Mazzinno Mantarini, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

- O'Neil, J. C. (1985), 'The Study of the New Testament', in *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, ed. Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz and Patrick Sherry, vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 143–78.
- Overbeck, Franz [1919] (1963), *Christentum und Kultur: Gedanken und Anmerkungen zur modernen Theologie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Overbeck, Franz [1873] (1981), *Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Price, D. T. W. (1977), *A History of Saint David's University College Lampeter*, vol. 1, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Purvis, Zachary (2016), *Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, Edward (1831), 'Theological Education in Germany', *Biblical Repository*, 1–4.
- Rogers Jr, Eugene F. (2006), 'Theology in the Curriculum of a Secular Religious Studies Department', *Cross Currents*, 56.2: 169–79.
- Schaff, Philip (1847), 'German Literature in America', *Bibliotheca sacra*, 4: 503–21.
- Schaff, Philip (1857), *Germany: Its Universities, Theology, and Religion*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
- Schelling, F. W. J. [1803] (1956), *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, in Ernst Anrich (ed.), *Der Idee der deutschen Universität*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. (1850), *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology*, trans. William Farrer, Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. [1811] (1910), *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesung*, ed. Heinrich Scholz, Leipzig: Deichert.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. [1808] (1956), 'Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn', in Ernst Anrich (ed.), *Der Idee der deutschen Universität*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. (1980), *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Herman Fischer et al., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. [1808] (1991), *Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense*, trans. Terrence N. Tice and Edwin Lawler, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. [1811] (2011), *Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study*, 3rd edn, trans. Terrence N. Tice, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Shrimpton, Paul (2014), *The 'Making of Men': The Idea and Reality of Newman's University in Oxford and Dublin*, Leominster: Gracewing.
- Snow, C. P. (1959), *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, Frank M. (2014), *European Intellectual History from Rousseau to Nietzsche*, ed. Richard A. Lofthouse, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Webster, John (1998), *Theological Theology*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Welch, Claude (1972), *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. 1: 1799–1870, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Williams, Rowan D. (1991), 'Theological Integrity', *New Blackfriars*, 72/847: 140–51.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig [1969] (1975), *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Zachhuber, Johannes (2013), *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From F. C. Bauer to Ernest Troeltsch*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.